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THE SEDITIOUS LIBEL TRIALS of the eighteenth century consti-
tute an important chapter in the history of freedom of the press 
and the growth of democratic government. While much has 
been written about the trials and about the administration of 
the criminal law in eighteenth-century England, little has been 
said about the relationship between the libel prosecutions and 
the more pervasive and long-standing problems of the 
criminal law. 1 We have perhaps gone too far in positing-or 
simply assuming-a separation between political high misde-
meanors and common-run felony cases such as homicide and 
theft. For there were points of contact between the two: most 
notably, the trial jury was employed in both. It may be that the-
use of the jury in the one kind of case influenced thinking 
about how it ought to be used in the other. I shall explore this 
subject in the light of the tract literature of the seditious libel 
crisis. I hope to elucidate the oft-repeated arguments concern-
ing the jury's right to decide law as well as fact, an alleged 
"right" that meant different things to different writers, and to 
say something about the kinds of knowledge that these pro-
jury writers thought jurors were to bring to their task. Finally, 
I shall set forth some tentative conclusions concerning the 
place that the seditious libel episode and its resolution had in 
the history of the jury and the administration of criminal law. 2 
By the time of the seditious libel crisis two strands of jury 
law-finding theory remained intact, one active, the other 
largely historical. A long-standing tradition in common-run 
cases of merciful acquittals and "partial" verdicts against the 
facts actually proved (for example, petty larceny instead of 
grand larceny, manslaughter instead of murder) continued 
apace with something close to official acquiescence. Although 
true nullification of judicial instructions (as opposed to ad hoc 
merciful verdicts that did not reflect repudiation of the law) 
was not officially approved, some very respectable jurists not 
only lauded the nullifying behavior of juries in some pre-168g 
political cases but, more significantly, could be read as suggest-
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ing that there might be occasions on which juries would once 
again be duty bound to play that role. 
The seditious libel tracts reflect the influence of these 
strands ofthought in a variety of ways. Especially, they reveal 
both the extent to which the radical jury proponents were able 
to build upon the views of the more conventional, establish-
ment, writers and the importance of the interplay between no-
tions of true nullification in political prosecutions and the tra-
dition of merciful verdicts in common-run cases. After briefly 
describing the seditious libel controversy (section 1) and the 
historical development of jury trial (section 2), I shall examine 
these themes, among others, in the course of considering, first, 
varying views of the constitutional role of the criminal trial 
jury (section 3) and, second, the tract writers' approach to 
finding law (section 4), finding fact (sections), and applying 
law to fact (section 6). My conclusion (section 7) puts the sedi-
tious libel controversy into historical perspective regarding the 
social, political, and legal aspects of the institution of trial by 
JUry. 
The common-law crime of seditious libel consisted-broadly 
speaking-of the intentional publication of a writing that 
"scandalized" the government, that is, tended to bring it into 
disesteem. Although indictments for seditious libel generally 
alleged that the accused had acted "falsely, seditiously, mali-
ciously, and factiously," the courts, as Holdsworth states, 
laid it down that . . . the offence consisted of the intentional 
publication of a document with the seditious or defamatory 
meaning alleged by the prosecution .... [T]he function of the 
jury was limited to finding these two sets of facts; ... it was for 
the court to say as a matter of law whether a writing published 
with this seditious or defamatory meaning was a libel. 3 
Thus, the jury was to render what amounted to a special ver-
dict (that is, a verdict stipulating the specific facts the jury had 
found) in the form of a general verdict of "guilty" if it found 
that the accused intentionally published the writing and if it 
found that the writing bore the meaning alleged by the pros-
ecution. 
The official doctrine, which Star Chamber had originated 
and transmitted to the common law, did not recognize truth as 
a defense. 4 Moreover, it assigned to the court as a matter of 
law two questions that had the appearance of questions of fact: 
whether the act was done with criminal intent, and whether 
the writing was seditious or defamatory. It was perhaps plausi-
ble to consider the latter question one of law because the na-
ture of the crime typically meant that the entire record of the 
allegedly criminal act was embodied in a physical specimen 
that survived for judicial inspection. It was less plausible to 
cast the question of criminal intent-or maliciousness-as one 
oflaw, to be inferred by the court. On both counts, the official 
doctrine was strongly resisted, from the Restoration trials of 
Carr5 and Harris6 in 168o and the great case of the Seven Bishops 
on the eve of the Glorious Revolution7 down to the reform of 
the doctrine by means of Fox's Libel Act in 1792.8 
We may note briefly the major phases of the seditious libel 
debate in the eighteenth century. From the perspective of 
nearly all participants in that debate, the Seven Bishops' Case 
had taken on the garb of hallowed precedent. For nearly all 
writers that great courtroom drama represented an act by the 
people which paved the way for the constitutional settlement 
that followed the Glorious Revolution ofx688-8g, wherein En-
glishmen consigned the law to its rightful place-the protec-
tive arms of an independent judiciary. 9 The case, which was 
tried in a highly charged political atmosphere, involved the 
prosecution of seven bishops who refused to read james II's 
Declaration of Indulgence in their churches. Because the 
bench divided on the question of whether the petition consti-
tuted a libel, that question was left, de facto, to the jury. 10 The 
acquittal of the bishops was taken to be both a rejection of 
James's pro-Catholic policies and a vindication, against the 
views of the bench, of the jury's right to determine the ques-
tions of intent and libelousness. The Seven Bishops' Case became 
a precedent for opposition to tyranny, an act oflast resort: jury 
nullification of the law (that is, the official doctrine of seditious 
libel, on which the bench had not una voce insisted) to save the 
constitution. Yet for some, this did not require rejection of the 
Stuart doctrine of seditious libel. An independent and impar-
tial bench could be trusted (or so the theory ran) to assign and 
determine all questions of law. Thus, in the century after the 
Glorious Revolution, much of the legal establishment both ac-
cepted the constitutional settlement and adhered to the essen-
tial elements of the Stuart law of libel. 11 
For many others, however, the Seven Bishops' Case stood for 
more. It was a vindication of the integrity of the general ver-
dict. For some this meant only that the traditional role of the 
trial jury, the finding of fact and the application to fact of the 
law as given by the bench, was preserved. Others, as we shall 
see, envisioned the general verdict as including not merely ap-
plication of the law but also true law finding. 
From the outset the eighteenth-century debate concerning 
the seditious libel doctrine was couched largely in Restoration 
terms. Chief Justice Raymond, relying heavily on the formu-
lation of his predecessor, Chief Justice Holt, restated the offi-
cial doctrine (outlined above) succinctly in Rex v. Franklin in 
1731, setting forth a division of judge-jury responsibilities that 
the courts would attempt to effectuate until the passage of 
Fox's Libel Act. 12 His opinion, in turn, revived the Restora-
tion defense of the criminal trial jury. In 1732, John Rawles's 
168o tract The Englishman's Right was reprinted for the first 
time. The new preface, signed by one J. K., warned of devel-
opments that threatened to destroy all that had been won in 
the Glorious Revolution and commended the tract "in which 
the original design, duty and power of jurors are so clearly ex-
plained, that it will be sufficient to instruct all those, who shall, 
on these occasions, have the lives and properties of their fel-
low-subjects in their hands." 13 In the tract itself, Hawles ar-
gued that in all cases, including libel, juries were the true 
judges of law as well as of fact, not simply that, in libel, sedi-
tiousness and intent were matters of fact for the jury. 14 
After Franklin's trial the contest over the doctrine of sedi-
tious libel falls into three principal stages. In 1752, the Crown 
tried by special jury (frequently the practice in seditious libel 
cases) a bookseller named William Owen for the sale of a tract 
critical of the House ofCommons. 15 Chief Justice Lee, on the 
urging of the solicitor general, William Murray (the future 
Lord Mansfield), charged the jury in accordance with Ray-
mond's statement of the law. The jury, after hearing testimony 
regarding Owen's character and loyalty to the Crown and 
Camden's argument that the right to criticize Parliament was 
fundamental, acquitted the defendant. Underlying Camden's 
argument for the defense was the principle that, notwithstand-
ing the bench's view of the law of seditious libel, unless the 
jury was convinced that the allegations of falsity and scan-
dalous intent in the indictment had been proved, it must ac-
quit.16 
The second stage in the English government's use of sedi-
tious libel laws to silence criticism of its policies began in 1763 
with the prosecution of John Wilkes for his famous number 45 
of The North Briton17 and ended in 1770 with the prosecution, on 
informations ex officio, of those who published and sold the 
"Junius" letter protesting the official policy toward the 
American colonies. Mansfield, as chief justice of King's 
Bench, enunciated the established law of seditious libel in the 
trials of the bookseller John Almon 18 and the publishers Henry 
Woodfall19 and John Miller. 20 Glynn, who defended all three, 
followed Camden's arguments in Owen almost verbatim. The 
Crown obtained a conviction in the case of Almon. The Wood-
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fall jury returned a verdict of" guilty of printing and publish-
ing only," which forced a judicial order for a new trial that was 
never held. At the close of Miller's trial, the jury returned a 
verdict of "not guilty" despite clear evidence of publication. 
These widely publicized "Junius" trials and Mansfield's 
consistent refusal to charge the jury that it should consider the 
question of criminal intent provoked debate in Parliament 
over the seditious libel law. Glynn introduced the question of 
reform in the Commons;21 Camden and Chatham supported 
him in the Lords. 22 They could not, however, agree on a new 
formulation. On the other side, opponents of reform raised the 
specter of jury control over the law and of the dissolution of ju-
dicial authority. 23 Some twenty years would elapse before suffi-
cient support could be mustered to pass a bill giving the jury 
the right to return a general verdict. 
The third stage of the seditious libel crisis commenced 
with the trial in 1783 of William Shipley, Dean of St. Asaph. 24 
Unquestionably, Shipley's case was the most important sedi-
tious libel prosecution since the Seven Bishops' Case. Shipley 
published a tract by his brother-in-law, Sir William] ones, that 
allegedly incited to rebellion; 25 after he was convicted with a 
verdict of "guilty of publishing only," a new trial was refused 
despite Thomas Erskine's ringing defense on Shipley's behalf. 
Yet after carrying the day on the law of libel, the bench set the 
conviction aside for a defect in the indictment. 26 
Mansfield won the battle, but he soon lost the war. The 
campaign against the seditious libel law greatly intensified. 
Erskine was lionized, and his cause was espoused in tracts, in 
the press, and, fmally, in Parliament.27 Fox's Libel Act, passed 
in 1792, did not convert the questions of intent and seditious-
ness into questions of fact but did state that in trials for sedi-
tious libel, 
the jury sworn to try the issue may give a general verdict of 
guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue . . . and 
44 
shall not be required or directed . . . to fmd the defendant or de-
fendants guilty, merely on the proof of the publication . . . and 
of the sense ascribed to the same .... 28 
The "whole matter" included the question of the existence of 
criminal intent, which almost always had to be inferred from 
the nature of the publication itself, and the question of whether 
the writing was seditious. The statute affirmed the jury's right 
to return a general verdict. It was clear that in doing so the 
jury would necessarily have the right to apply the law (regard-
ing criminal intent and seditiousness) as stated by the bench; 
that the jury possessed the right to reject the law as stated by 
the bench was neither stated nor implied. That it might do so, 
in a concealed fashion, was undoubtedly understood-and (by 
many) feared.29 
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Arguments over the jury's role in the more spectacular politi-
cal cases had always been colored by perceptions of its role in 
the daily administration of the criminal law. Thus, to under-
stand the place of the seditious libel debate in eighteenth-
century law and politics, we must consider some aspects of the 
history of the criminal trial jury. Specifically, we must consider 
how two main eighteenth-century concepts of jury law finding 
emerged out of age-old jury practices. 
The English criminal trial jury emerged during the final 
stage of the first great revolution in English criminal law, the 
series of changes traditionally associated with Henry II and his 
immediate successors. Over the course of the twelfth century, 
and most dramatically during the last quarter of that century, 
the criminal law was transformed from a private, compensa-
tion-based system of law into a public and-at least at the fel-
ony level-capital system of law. 30 The Crown had from the 
outset sought lay cooperation in effectuating its policy. Trial on 
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the king's suit, leading to execution at the hands of the Crown, 
was set in motion by the procedure of presentment. It may be, 
though we cannot be certain, that the lay presenters resisted 
strict application of the new system of criminal law. 31 After the 
abolition of the ordeal in 1215, the English adopted a system of 
community-based fact fmding to act as a method of proof. Al-
most immediately community resistance to the strict applica-
tion of the formal legal rules became visible. For several centu-
ries there was little to impede this. The trial jury, self-inform-
ing and thus free to decide what constituted evidence, was able 
to impose its concepts of liability upon the administration of 
the criminal law. Many who slew out of sudden anger were ac-
quitted or said to have acted in self-defense; many simple 
thieves were saved from the gallows by acquittal. 32 We cannot 
determine the extent of official acquiescence in this de facto jury 
law-finding process. We may only suppose that authorities 
devoted more of their limited resources to combating truly cor-
rupt jury practices in cases involving professional criminals 
than to contesting merciful jury verdicts in cases involving rel-
atively marginal offenders. 
The first important transformation in the history of the 
criminal trial jury dates from the fifteenth and sixteenth centu-
ries. It was associated with the rise of official prosecution prac-
tices. Justices of the peace began to play an active role in 
gathering evidence that might be used in court to substantiate 
indictments that they had taken and that assize clerks had 
carefully reframed. 33 As this happened, the trial jury gradually 
lost its self-informing role although it retained its role of assess-
ing evidence and of rendering a verdict. While the jury had 
not lost its power to nullify rules of law, the increasingly public 
nature of the flow of evidence cost the jury some of its power to 
conceal from the bench the degree to which an acquittal-or 
for that matter a conviction-was based, not on strict applica-
tion of law to fact, but on a sense of justice or some form of fa-
voritism.34 Although the rise of the prosecution made it possi-
ble for officials to monitor jury behavior-and, if they so 
chose, to bind over to Star Chamber even the merciful 
jury35-constraints of time, administrative capacity, and in-
terest put the jury at greatest risk in those cases the Crown con-
sidered most serious. Thus, in the "middle period," the bench 
used the available official machinery of jury discipline to the 
fullest in some instances and allowed-even encouraged-
age-old community-based practices to continue in others. 36 
Perhaps inevitably, the political opposition in the former in-
stances came to articulate a theory of jury law finding, to argue 
not only that it was legitimate but also that it was integral to 
the right to trial by jury. The Interregnum and Restoration 
saw the writing of a good deal of bad history: de facto law-fmd-
ing practices in common-run felonies were construed as de jure 
and generalized to all criminal cases. The basis for the jury's de 
jure right to find the law was discovered in Anglo-Saxon liber-
ties and in post-Conquest resistance to the Norman judiciary's 
attempts to undermine true English justice. From Lilburne's 
1649 trial to Penn's Case in 1670, and beyond, arguments con-
cerning the original rights of English juries occupied an impor-
tant place in English democratic writings. 37 
The Leveller and Quaker law-finding theories never really 
took hold, but they remained embedded in English resistance 
theory and were, during the later years of the Restoration, ap-
pealed to by some of those who opposed the official doctrine of 
seditious libel. They helped to form the ideological support for 
what we may call the true law-finding, or nullifying, role of the 
jury-its asserted duty to nullify the law in cases involving ex-
ecutive or judicial tyranny. 38 
Because these theories presumed the possibility of conflict 
between the jury and the bench, they must be distinguished 
from the older and dominant, but much more modest, law-
finding theory of the criminal trial jury. According to that 
theory, the jury as the fmal determiner of fact applied the law 
more or less as stated by the bench but might, through its abil-
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ity to fmd facts or even at the behest of judges, mitigate the rig-
ors of the law in appropriate cases. But this theory, which cap-
tures the nature of the period's modest de facto practices, was 
never official doctrine, and the practices it approves of were 
never unreservedly acquiesced in by the bench. The courts, 
we have seen, episodically (though only rarely) punished juries 
for modest leniency by binding them over to the Court of Star 
Chamber; after the abolition of Star Chamber in 1641 they im-
posed fmes upon juries that rendered what the bench thought 
of as unjustified acquittals. 39 Bushell's Case in 1670 marked the 
end of such coercion. 40 In his famous opinion, Chief Justice 
Vaughan held that jurors could not be fined for acquitting 
against the weight of evidence because they alone had the re-
sponsibility to find the facts and the court could never know 
completely how they saw them. 41 Vaughan's opinion, though 
it grew out of a political case wherein the defendants had in-
voked the jury's right to find law, 42 did not sanction nullifica-
tion-not even the modest, merciful practices that the non-
coercible jury might (thanks to his opinion) have felt free to 
implement. Within a decade, however, in response to the 
Harris and Carr seditious libel prosecutions, anti-Stuart 
writers (including john Rawles) had glossed Vaughan's opin-
ion and it had entered the jury literature, much revised, as a 
powerful argument for the jury's right to nullify the law-not 
only to be merciful in common-run cases but also to overturn 
what it regarded as unlawful judicial instructions in prosecu-
tions for treason, seditious libel, or other essentially political 
offenses. 43 These ideas appear to have gained some ground 
even among the establishment opposition to James II. 
However the anti-Stuart Whig leadership may have felt 
about the more far-reaching jury law-fmding rhetoric, once it 
had come to power in 168g it argued that the constitutional set-
dement, and especially the establishment of judicial indepen-
dence, had rendered true jury nullification-nullification of 
judicial instructions-unnecessary. Yet that same Whig re-
gime acquiesced in a great deal of jury mitigation of capital 
sanctions-merciful application of the law-in common-run 
cases. 44 Substantial penalties, such as the quasi exile of trans-
portation, now existed for lesser offenses so that partial mitiga-
tion did not seriously flout the king' s justice or threaten popu-
lar security. 45 
Although authorities acquiesced in such practices and even, 
as some historians have argued, turned them to their own ad-
vantage-that is, by being seen to act mercifully, they engen-
dered the deference of those they ruled46-many jurists and lay 
observers (including some political radicals)47 came to doubt 
the deterrent effect-and hence the wisdom-of a system of 
criminal law that corrected for the inhumanity of its prescribed 
sanctions through ad hoc recourse to dispersed powers of miti-
gation. Henry Fielding, at mid-century, and then Blackstone, 
Eden, Romilly, and others in later decades, condemned the 
prevailing system. 48 They argued for a reformed, humane, 
and effective law of sanctions, one that was moderate and pro-
portional and that could be applied with certainty. Mitigation, 
they conceded, could never be entirely dispensed with, but 
what little would be required should be centered in the 
Crown's pardoning power. The role of the jury would be to 
find the facts. If it did so mercifully, it would be merciful in the 
sense of extending the benefit of the doubt in close cases, not in 
the sense of mercifully acquitting a defendant who on the evi-
dence was clearly guilty. 49 
Not surprisingly, however, these critics distinguished be-
tween the reformed future and the unreformed present: so 
long as the law of sanctions remained overly severe, wide-
spread mitigation, they recognized, was both inevitable and 
just, a lesser evil, a form of "pious perjury. " 50 Beginning with 
a critique of jury mitigation, the penal reformers ended by 
providing its existence pro tern with an important element of 
justification. And in yet another way the penal reform 
writers-and indeed many others-lent support to the propo-
49 
nents of jury discretion, by recognizing the historic role of the 
jury as a bulwark against tyranny, especially in political cases. 
Though virtually all of them believed that this far-reaching 
form of nullification was no longer likely to be necessary, they 
were willing to pay lip service to this ultimate constitutional 
role of the criminal trial jury, 51 as were, indeed, some members 
of the bench. 52 
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The post-1750 discussion of the constitutional role of the 
criminal trial jury was pervaded by arguments that drew upon 
history. Virtually all commentators on the jury were con-
vinced of the pre-Conquest origins of the jury. A few writers 
searched for its prototype in the classical world; 53 some traced 
the jury to the Goths;54 most posited a Saxon origin, identify-
ing the early laggamanni as combining the roles of judge and 
jury. 55 For the most part, however, this fascination with the 
earliest period of the jury remained an antiquarian exercise. It 
is true that eighteenth-century jury proponents thought that 
the jury's antiquity bolstered its place in the constitution, but 
no one disputed that the jury deserved some place. Exactly 
what place the jury ought to have was the question on which 
contemporaries disagreed. Here the eighteenth-century theo-
rists had little in common with their mid-seventeenth-century 
forerunners. Few of the later writers contended, as had some 
Levellers, that historically the jury had preceded the judiciary 
or that the law flowed forth from the community through the 
jury. Whatever their perspective on the law-finding power of 
the jury, the eighteenth-century writers reflected an implicit 
acceptance of a Lockeian view of the origins of civil society. 
They took for granted the quasi balance of powers created by 
the settlement of x68g and the dominant role of Parliament in 
the making of law. The jury, even in the view of most of those 
who favored jury law finding, was supposed to guarantee that 
English law, whether common law or statutory law, was fairly 
stated and fairly applied. 
For some eighteenth-century jury proponents the jury was 
not so much a part of the constitution as a symbol of the source 
of power that created civil government and the constitution it-
self. Henry Burtenshaw maintained that the jury are not 
the creatures, even of the constitution, but coeval with it-with 
the constitution which declares all power to be in the people, 
and which has survived and remained unviolated through 
many revolutions of state government: they are themselves a 
government in miniature, and a symbol of that general democ-
racy in which resides, and through which, under various modi-
fications, is dispersed, all the functions of power, of justice and 
of policy. 56 
But even Burtenshaw recognized that laws were made in Par-
liament or "abroad, by [the people's] habits of life and us-
ages," so that the jury, in his view, was to "interpret those laws 
when made. " 57 Most commentators took an even more 
frankly instrumental view of the jury: the jury was a part of the 
constitution, established in order to fill a gap or to balance lay 
against official influence. Blackstone lent important support to 
this watchdog theory of the criminal trial jury. He cautioned 
against creation of more "convenient" procedures; the "de-
lays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are the 
price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more 
substantial matters .... " 58 Despite ambiguity in its charac-
terization of the jury's role, Blackstone's theory strongly im-
plied that the jury remained a safeguard against some future 
recurrence of executive or judicial tyranny. 
Blackstone's contemporary Henry Dagge traced the origins 
of civil society in terms familiar to eighteenth-century political 
theorists. He began with a discussion of man in his natural 
state and with a depiction of the resolution of dispute by pri-
vate revenge; this period of continual strife, he asserted, gave 
way to government and, eventually, to the creation of distinc-
tive elements of government: legislative, executive, and judi-
cial. Even at this stage," after the three powers were divided," 
difficulties remained: 
The judicial power being entrusted with the exposition of the 
law, and as it depended on their judgment whether the case or 
fact sub lite, was or was not within the description of the law, 
here was evidently a great latitude still left for the exercise of 
partiality or oppression. 59 
The "remedy," he concluded, was "the invention of juries. " 60 
Dagge assured his readers that it seldom happened that juries 
rejected the judge's instructions: "The opinion of the bench 
has generally its due weight. " 61 For the most part, the jury was 
to find fact and no more, and the better the primary institu-
tions of government worked, the less the jury would be needed 
as a safeguard of the liberties those institutions were designed 
to protect. This view of the jury was adumbrated even by Wil-
liam Paley, who exhibited tolerance for a complex, sometimes 
unpredictable, legal process. In his view, there would and 
ought to be countervailing pressures, from which an equitable 
solution would emerge. The jury's role could not be given 
clearly defmed limits; thus Paley cautioned against "urging 
too far the distinction between questions of law and matters of 
fact. " 62 
None of these prominent academic legal writers directed his 
attention specifically to the debate resulting from trials for se-
ditious libel. Indeed, none set out to write mainly about the 
jury. Rather, each developed a distinctive approach to the legal 
system generally, fitting the jury into the larger scheme of 
things. None subscribed to a far-reaching theory of endemic 
jury law deciding, but all believed-or strongly implied-that, 
for the legal system to operate fairly, recourse to jury moni-
toring of judicial instructions on the law would sometimes be 
necessary. This conception of the jury was of course shared-
and fruitfully used-by most writers who wrote in response to 
the government's doctrine of seditious libel. For these latter 
writers, however, the jury was not incidentally, but rather in 
the main, a safeguard against oppression. 
Robert Morris, the Wilkite barrister, sounded a theme to 
which many of Mansfield's opponents rallied when he wrote: 
"The great province of a jury in criminal matters is to make 
true deliverance of the subject from false accusation, and espe-
cially from oppressive prosecutions of the Crown.' '63 The jury, 
Glynn was quoted as stating at the trial in 1770 of the publisher 
John Miller, is "in times of danger the asylum of the peo-
ple. . . . " 64 It was to protect "every subject of the state, from 
the abuse of executive power,'' wrote Thomas Leach, that the 
English constitution required "the unanimous suffrage of 
twelve of his equals. " 65 Judges, who were still dependent upon 
the Crown for "pensions" and "places, which they hold at the 
mere pleasure of their minister,"66 were not above "crafty dis-
tinctions and ensnaring eloquence"; they "throw dust in the 
eyes, and confound the sense of a well-meaning jury. . . . "67 
Such invective became commonplace in the years between the 
Wilkes affair and the Dean of St. Asaph's trial. 
The encomiums of the more radical supporters of the jury 
typically began with generalities from Hale or Blackstone and 
went on to the limits of their authors' imaginations. Jury trial 
was, for example, central to "the grand or principal law of this 
land, on which the justice of all the rest depend .... " 68 It was 
through the jury that subjects judged "when the fundamental 
laws are violated; when an attempt is made to subvert the con-
stitution. " 69 Even the charges that jurors lacked legal training, 
were just plain ignorant, or were subject to popular passions 
were occasions for praise, albeit at times with a defensive tone. 
Jurors, it was frequently said, did not lack the natural capacity 
for the role they were being asked to play. They have, wrote 
Manasseh Dawes, "generally a just sense of right or wrong. "70 
''Juries have not a knowledge of the technical niceties of the 
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law, as a profession," Capel Lofft conceded, "but the Consti-
tution presumes them to understand it as a rule of civil rights 
in a general sense. " 71 "Thanks be to God!" Anthony 
Highmore exclaimed, "there lives in mankind a sense of right 
and wrong that compels them to form the most impartial judg-
ment they can .... " 72 All three of these writers were trained 
in law; all opposed one or another Crown policy; and all re-
sented use of the libel laws to silence criticism. 
A general sense of civil rights and a sense of right and wrong 
were required, but not deep grounding in Scripture, custom, 
or the common law. For some, this was the irreducible core 
which law-finding theory had reached by the late eighteenth 
century. So long as law deciding was linked to ''pious perjury'' 
or to egregious cases where the jury was required to stand as a 
bulwark against judicial overreach, even the moderate, bench-
oriented Blackstone could be put to some use. George Rous, 
yet another Wilkite barrister, quoted Blackstone's admonition 
to subjects that they learn the law; their lack of such learning, 
Blackstone had written, "has thrown more power into the 
hands of judges to direct, control, and even reverse, their ver-
dicts, than perhaps the constitution intended. " 73 
Some who supported the law-finding jury conceded that 
juries might make too much of their powers or misunderstand 
how they ought to be employed. Rous, for example, wrote: 
"Jurors, like judges, may err through ignorance, or be misled 
by passion. " 74 But, he concluded, the constitution wisely con-
tained a remedy-where, that is, a jury wrongly convicted the 
defendant. Drawing, as did many other tract writers, upon 
practice in common-run felonies, Rous asserted that "grace is 
always extended to the prisoner upon a proper representation 
from the judge. A refusal would be contrary to the duty of a 
sovereign, who swears, at his coronation, to execute justice in 
mercy. " 75 In the case of seditious libel, however-at least be-
fore 1792-the government feared what it viewed as unwar-
ranted acquittals, not unwarranted convictions. Those radical 
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pro-jury writers willing to face this problem manipulated the 
language of the moderates Dagge and Blackstone, characteriz-
ing truly unwarranted acquittals as a "lesser inconvenience" 76 
and retreating to the well-worn maxim that it was better that 
many guilty men went free than that one innocent man was 
convicted. However tolerable this maxim may have been in 
cases of manslaughter or petty theft, it was unlikely that 
authorities would be content to apply it to cases involving gov-
ernment critics. 
4 
Only a minority of pro-jury writers who addressed the prob-
lem of seditious libel dealt openly and at length with the fur-
ther reaching of the two theories of jury right, true law finding: 
the jury's alleged right to reject an indictment, regardless of 
the judge's instructions, on the grounds that it failed to charge 
the defendant with a crime. Those who advanced this position 
drew directly upon the late seventeenth-century tracts by 
Hawles, Care, and the anonymous author of A Guide to juries, 
all of whom had, in turn, drawn upon claims made by 
Lilburne and Penn. Perhaps the strongest version of this argu-
ment was the statement of the printer and bookseller Joseph 
Towers: 
It cannot be supposed ... that any jury should be arbitrarily 
directed to bring any man in guilty, when they are not con-
vinced in their own minds, whether the action the accused per-
son is charged with be a crime or not . . . not only whether he 
has been guilty of the action alleged against him, but whether he 
has been guilty of a crime.77 
The most offensive aspect of the seditious libel doctrine-so 
far as pro-jury writers were concerned-was that truth was not 
a defense; moreover, the prosecution did not have to prove 
that the alleged libel in fact brought the government into disre-
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pute or created an imminent threat to public order, even 
though indictments for seditious libel alleged that the defen-
dant had published certain statements "seditiously" and "fac-
tiously.'' Thus one writer, who reproduced some ten pages of 
Hawles's famous tract, concluded in his own terms: 
From all which it is evident, that however heinous a fact may 
be represented by hard work and artful innuendoes in an indict-
ment or information, the jury may with impunity, and ought in 
conscience to bring in the general verdict, not guilty, not only 
when they think the fact has not been proved by sufficient wit-
nesses, but also when they think the fact is not such a heinous 
fact as is charged in the indictment or information. 78 
Another writer made the point in his comments upon the 
Penn-Mead trial of a century earlier: 
As the jury were not convinced, that the fact, with which Penn 
and Mead were charged was in itself a crime, they were unwill-
ing to condemn them; though, attending to the matter of fact 
only, they could not avoid it, because the fact was fully 
proved .... [I]t is plain, the jury had respect, in their last ver-
dict, entirely to the matter of law. For as they were convinced, 
that Penn and Mead had not been guilty of any criminal or ille-
gal action, they could not honestly and conscientiously do any-
thing but acquit them. 79 
In their arguments for true law-fmding powers, jury propo-
nents looked for support to the rules of criminal procedure and 
to the nature of the substantive criminal law. Most of the argu-
ments devolving from procedure touched upon the supposed 
theoretical liability of the jury to an attaint. Although this an-
cient procedure had probably never been applied in criminal 
cases, 80 most eighteenth-century jury proponents referred 
only to its "disuse," drawing the conclusion (perhaps from 
Restoratioh tracts) that attaint, like the fining of jurors, had 
once been, but was no longer, permitted by English law. The 
original law of attaint, they asserted, must have assumed the 
right of juries to decide law as well as fact, for attaint had ap-
plied only in those cases where the jury had found "bad" 
law.81 A Treatise on the Right of Juries (1771) carried this analysis 
one step further: the fact that since Bushell's Case the law had 
supplied no certain means of controlling jury verdicts (at least 
in the case of an acquittal) proved not only that the jury had 
the power but also that it had the right to find law. 82 Even Jus-
tice Willes, who voted with the majority in St. Asaph 's Case, 
found this argument persuasive.83 On the eve of Parliament's 
consideration of the Libel Act, his views were rephrased by 
Thomas Leach, a barrister and police magistrate, who wrote: 
In the institutions of civil government, power and right, are, 
and must be, convertible terms. Civil power, and civil right, are 
the mere creatures of the law and know no other limits, than the 
law imposes upon them. The law speaks the language of prohi-
bition, not of admonition. What it permits to be done, uncen-
sured, and confirms, when it is done, it has delegated the power 
to do, and the exercise of that power, is of right. 84 
Similarly, pro-jury writers argued that the theory of the spe-
cial verdict presumed that juries had a valid law-finding role. 
A jury could render a special verdict in a case if it doubted the 
validity of a certain application of the law to the facts. 85 If the 
jury had no such doubts, it was therefore said, the jury might 
find law as well as fact. 86 This argument, however, established 
nothing more than that juries applied law to fact. The law 
might still be said to have been taken from the bench, a point 
that many tract writers well understood. Finally, many writers 
cited the practice of defense counsel in seditious libel cases to 
support the proposition that juries had the right to consider 
questions of law. The bench frequently allowed counsel to ar-
gue points of law to the jury or even to question the validity of 
the official doctrine of seditious libel in their summations. 87 
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Yet arguments that relied upon the nature of criminal pro-
cedure and trial practice were entirely too fragile to support a 
far-reaching claim to jury law finding. The attaint issue 
was dead (indeed, it had never been a live consideration in 
criminal cases); the existence of special verdicts, it could be 
countered, proved only that in some cases the jury had doubts 
concerning a very restricted "law-applying" role. As for the 
leeway allowed counsel in their summations, such judicial le-
niency was hardly a sound foundation for the construction of a 
matter of jury right. Few laymen understood criminal proce-
dure sufficiently to appreciate what were, in any case, tepid re-
joinders to Mansfield's dissertations on the ever-growing body 
of precedent. 
Of greater importance-though, in logic, equally limited-
were arguments based upon the nature of the substantive 
criminal law, not only in political cases but in common-run 
cases as well. The criminal law, it was stated, was "within 
reach of the plainest understanding. " 88 Such claims, it is true, 
were only a pale reminder of mid-seventeenth-century asser-
tions concerning the relationship between criminal law and the 
Scriptures; nor was it the point that the common man could 
know the law merely by examining his heart. But the criminal 
law was knowable. The entire system of criminal justice as-
sumed as much: 
To say the truth, one could hardly imagine a more extravagant 
absurdity, than to hold, that a criminal shall not remove the im-
putation of guilt by pleading ignorance of the law; and yet, that 
a jury who try him have no capacities to judge of that law. 89 
The logical conclusion of the argument that only the bench 
and bar possessed the ability to understand the law, it was 
said, was that "we may daily transgress without being wilfully 
guilty. " 90 The robber, the sneak thief, the slayer-they knew 
the law as it applied to them. The point was frequently re-
peated, always with a certain tone of astonishment: If the jury 
was not to decide law because men oftheir station lacked the 
necessary understanding, then the rationale for the official 
doctrine of seditious libel was inconsistent with the require-
ment of mens rea. 91 The analogy to common-run cases-to the 
common suspect, the "daily transgressor"-lent force to the 
point, but, at the same time, the line of argument here in-
volved did not ground a true law-finding theory. To say that 
the jury possessed the ability to apply the law was not to say 
that the law they were to apply was "found" by them rather 
than set forth by the bench. 
5 
For many commentators the issues of freedom of the press 
and, more generally, of the subject's right to criticize the gov-
ernment were more important than the jury question. The 
jury was significant, not as an end in itself, but as a safeguard 
against what were seen as the government's interested and 
abusive prosecutions. Arguments asserting that the jury was 
the protector of liberty were made both by those \\-ho con-
ceived of the jury primarily as a fact finder and by those who 
adhered to one or another variant of law-finding theory. Dis-
trust of the government did not commit one to any particular 
conception of the jury. Yet the doctrine of seditious libel posed 
a special sort of problem. By drastically reducing the scope fox 
factual determinations, the doctrine placed the defendant'.' 
fate almost wholly in official hands. To assert the jury's right to 
play its traditional fact-finding role required an attack on the 
libel doctrine itself. Hence, all appeals to the jury necessarily 
contained an express or implied demand that the jury reject 
the bench's instructions regarding the allocation of duties be-
tween judge and jury. Only a few writers focused on the prob-
lem-it seemed to go without saying. Of the pro-jury writers, 
Joseph Towers most effectively united the themes of distrust of 
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government and the jury's right to decide the allocation-of-du-
ties question raised by the seditious libel doctrine: 
It would, perhaps, be as unreasonable, that kings should be 
suffered themselves to determine the bounds of their own pre-
rogative, as that judges should be permitted finally to decide, 
when the point in contest is, what is the extent of their own 
jurisdiction, and what is the extent of that of juries. 92 
Thus, much, if not most, of the literature proclaiming the 
jury's right to find law as well as fact was concerned with the 
problem of the allocation of duties between judge and jury. 
Though many tract writers seem not to have realized it, this 
conceptualization of the problem hid important disagreements 
on the law itself. Many writers assigned as facts for the jury 
matters that the bench did not consider at all relevant. None-
theless, for many opponents of the official doctrine the claim 
regarding jury law finding was simply an exhortation to jurors 
that they insist that certain questions were matters of fact 
rather than matters of law. Once the jury had claimed the 
question for its own, it would merely find the fact, in seditious 
libel as in other cases. 
In the years following Rex v. Franklin, 93 the assertion that se-
ditiousness was purely a question of fact became quite com-
mon. Pro-jury writers argued that, at one level, the question of 
the seditiousness of the writing could be reduced to the ques-
tion: Had the writing "scandalized" the government? But 
what test should the jury apply when making this assessment? 
The proponents of free speech and press and of the trial jury 
insisted that mere evidence of negative criticism was not suffi-
cient, that a writing was not criminal unless, at the very least, 
measurable harm was its probable result. 94 Some character-
ized the test as more complex still. Robert Morris thought it 
should be "[t]he purport of expressions, the tendency to sedi-
tion, the infamy, the reproach of language"; that, he said, 
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''can never so well be decided as by the common class of mor-
tals to whom the publication is made. Who [is] more interested 
than juries (for juries are composed of the people) to preserve 
the peace and order ofthe state? . . . Juries are a tribunal ever 
changing as the times; they judge of men's writings and ac-
tions by what they see and feel. " 95 The decider offact, George 
Rous asserted, sounding a theme dear to the hearts of the 
Wilkites, "must enter into common life ... must attend to the 
politics of the day. . . must imbibe the sentiments of the peo-
ple .... Juries taken by lot ... are peculiarly the proper 
judges in cases of libel. " 96 The determination that must 
be made, wrote Joseph Towers, required practically no 
knowledge of the law; the allegedly seditious publications were 
"generally addressed to men of all professions, and such of 
them as can be understood only by lawyers, are not very likely 
to produce tumults or insurrections. " 97 Highmore developed 
the same theme: If one argues that a libel is dangerous because 
it might arouse the common people, then one assumes that the 
people understand the writing and therefore must be qualified 
to be jurors, to determine whether a writing is, in fact, likely to 
arouse. "No man ever wrote, or read, sedition, but he knew 
that it was so: and this, without a little more knowledge of the 
law than is amply sufficient to answer all the purposes of his 
civil capacity as a citizen. " 98 Here, where pro-jury writers re-
ferred specifically to the kind of fact finding they believed rele-
vant to the matter of seditious libel, they frequently drew at-
tention to the jury's daily assessment of the element of provo-
cation in cases ofhomicide.99 It is possible that some pro-jury 
tract writers, in their attempts to portray seditiousness as a 
question of fact as in other cases, were induced to concede 
more than they otherwise might have. They were led to define 
seditiousness in terms of a writing's tendency to arouse, its im-
pact on others, especially on the class of common people from 
which jurors were typically drawn. Some writers seem at times 
to have turned their attention from the question of the truth, 
or of the intrinsic value, of the criticism, matters that were less 
easily portrayed as matters of fact within the competence of the 
average jury. 100 
At yet a second level, most writers insisted that proof of 
scandal did not suffice to establish true seditiousness. There 
had also to be a finding of intent to scandalize-true crim-
inal intent-indeed, true malice. 101 This, too, was at times 
portrayed as a matter of pure fact finding in terms with which 
we are now familiar. What words were intended to mean, said 
Morris, was a factual, hence a jury, question; 102 though estab-
lishing that meaning, as Francis Maseres argued, required the 
jury to draw inferences from facts, those inferences were "sec-
ondary" facts, which required "common sense, not technical 
learning." 103 Juries were especially qualified in cases of libel 
since they knew "street talk" 104 and could draw the proper in-
ferences. As another writer put it: a "jury of common coffee-
house politicians in London" was best qualified to determine 
the fact of whether words were meant to be scandalous. 105 
In most tracts, however, the discussion of criminal intent 
moved well beyond the immediate issue of seditious libel. 
Here, more than at any other point, writers looked to the role 
of juries in common-run felonies. Traditionally, juries assessed 
guilt or innocence largely on the basis of the intent with which 
an act had been committed. It was within this assessment that 
the jury, consciously or otherwise, had always applied its own 
standards of justice, weighed intent and conduct (and perhaps 
reputation) against the prescribed sanction. 106 By ruling that 
criminal intent would be inferred by the bench from the writ-
ing itself, the bench threatened the more modest but ancient 
law-finding tradition and, hence, the values that the right to 
jury trial had long epitomized. 
The pro-jury writers' inability consistently to maintain the 
idea-ought one say, the tactical stance?-that the question of 
intent could be reduced to a purely factual matter is reflected 
in their constant analogizing to the jury's role in homicide 
cases. In homicide cases, as many tract writers pointed out, 
the bench drew the jury's attention to the differences among 
malice aforethought, sudden deliberateness, unintentional 
homicide, and intentional but justifiable homicide, and there-
upon left the matter to the jury. 107 The homicide analogy was 
in fact cited to prove that juries had the right to apply law to 
the facts. It was this traditional law-applying role that the 
bench was attempting to remove in seditious libel cases, or so 
many pro-jury writers charged. 108 Thomas Leach, extrapolat-
ing from homicide to "all other cases of crime" -by which he 
meant seditious libel-declared: 
On indictment for murder, the jury decide, not only that the 
person, charged to have been murdered, did die, in conse-
quence of the act of the defendant, and that such act resulted 
from a design to kill; which are matters of fact: But they also de-
cide, whether from the particular circumstances, attending the 
homicide, it is to be ranked in that class, which the law justifies 
or excuses; or whether from the degree of criminal intention in 
the defendant it comes within the legal defmition of the crime of 
manslaughter; or amounts to murder, which, if the intention of 
the libeller be matter oflaw, are evidently also matters oflaw. 109 
For Leach, as for so many others across the half-century of 
active debate, the homicide analogy provided the basic model. 
Did the defendant strike (did he publish); did the blow cause 
death (did the writing scandalize); were the blow and death (or 
the scandal) intended and, if so, was there true malice or was 
the act justified or excusable? There was bound to be occa-
sional disagreement between judge and jury on what consti-
tuted one or another degree of malice, on the limits of justifica-
tion and excuse, or on their application to a given case. That 
was often true in homicide and it was certain to be true in sedi-
tious libel. The centuries-long tradition of allowing the jury 
leeway in its application of the law of homicide appears to have 
colored assumptions about the appropriate judge-jury role in 
seditious libel. 110 And just as disagreements between judge 
and jury on the law of homicide were conceptualized as dis-
agreements merely about application of law to fact, so were 
such disagreements conceptualized by many opponents of the 
official doctrine of seditious libel. 
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The claim that the jury's inalienable role was that which they 
played daily in routine felonies-the application of the law that 
had been set forth by the bench-lay at the core of the attack 
on the law of seditious libel. The true law-finding issues of the 
debate-the jury's capacity to comprehend the law sufficiently 
to determine whether the judge had chosen apt precedents or 
had interpreted the relevant common law or statutes correct-
ly-would continue to attract great attention, but the more 
routine discussion of whether the jury had the right merely to 
apply the law in seditious libel "as in other cases" was perhaps 
a more important aspect of the debate. When the pro-jury 
writers addressed this most basic level of "law finding," they 
revealed something of their conception of the nature and pur-
pose of the jury trial in all criminal cases. 
It is important to remember that, in practice, the criminal 
trial had always been person- (as well as act-) oriented. Assess-
ment of the defendant's character had traditionally affected 
the jury's view of his just deserts. 111 Character and credibility 
of course bore on the question of whether the defendant had 
committed the act alleged in the indictment, and in that sense 
the jury found the facts that it was charged to find. This obser-
vation was contained in The Doctrine of Libels and the Duty of 
Juries fairly stated, published in 1752: 
[I]f from the character of the person libelled they think they 
have reason to believe, that he has been guilty of those facts, and 
that from the character of the person accused of libelling they 
have reason to believe [the defendant] would not have charged 
any man with such facts unless he had known him to be guilty, 
they ought to bring their verdict Not Guilty .... This is a lati-
tude which every jury ought to take, and a latitude which will be 
of great importance for every man to endeavor to preserve a 
good character in his neighborhood. 112 
This "latitude" was implicit in every jury trial. Thus George 
Stanhope in his sermon entitled The Duty of juries, which was 
delivered in 1701 at the Lent Assizes, conceded that in close 
cases, 
we may allow some abatements for a criminal action alleged 
against a person unblameable for the main, and impute it to ig-
norance, or sudden transport or passion, or misadventure, 
rather than to malice and wicked design; which abatements 
cannot fairly be allowed to those abandoned wretches, who are 
scandalous for mischievous dispositions and a profligate con-
versation.113 
The problem was how to delineate between appropriate and 
inappropriate "abatements." That depended upon the suffi-
ciency of the proof offered at trial, of which juries were without 
dispute the final judges. The official doctrine of seditious libel 
avoided this assessment entirely. The only facts left to the jury 
were so fully proved as to be virtually undeniable, and there 
was in any case nothing to balance against them, since intent 
was "implied" as a matter oflaw. What the opponents of the 
official law were demanding was the return to the jury, as a 
question of fact or of application of law to fact, of the compli-
cated, intensely social question of criminal intent. 
The seditious libel literature often assigned to the jury an 
even more open-ended role than the above discussion of 
criminal intent suggests. Fundamentally, according to pro-
jury writers, whether in prosecutions for seditious libel; homi-
cide, theft, or any other criminal offense, the defense of the 
(truly) general verdict amounted to the defense of the defen-
dant's right to a "merciful" judgment by peers. And "mercy" 
might be appropriate even in cases where the defendant was 
guilty under the law. The core of the power to decide "law as 
well as fact" was the jury's right to nullify the law in particular 
cases without rejecting it as a general matter. 
That the English criminal law was a "merciful" law was a 
cliche in the eighteenth-century literature. 114 The identifica-
tion of the jury with mercy operated on two levels. Most 
writers, referring to the fact-finding process, asserted that, as 
Towers put it:' 'Where the matter is doubtful, in criminal pros-
ecutions, an acquittal is always most consonant to the spirit of 
the law of England." 115 Hinting at a yet broader role for the 
granting of mercy, Highmore observed: "[T]he jury know 
that by their verdict alone, and not by the knowledge of law in 
the judge, the prisoner at the Bar must be acquitted or suffer 
death." 116 As in the capital felonies of murder or theft, he im-
plied, so in the noncapital high misdemeanor of seditious libel. 
Morris drew an analogy to the royal power of pardon: "Like 
the king in the extension of mercy [the jury] make so noble a 
use of their power when their consciences permit them to ac-
quit." 117 
In his Address to the People of Scotland, William Smellie de-
scribed this second, commonplace, and ultimately more sig-
nificant aspect of the jury's application of mercy. Commenting 
upon the statutory extension of jury trial to Scotland, and bor-
rowing the terminology of the English seditious libel debate, 
he asserted: 
If, therefore, the power of judging of the law as well as the fact, 
were annihilated, the very intention of the legislature would be 
defeated; because the courts, and not the jury, would then be 
the sole judges. Intention is the essence of crimes. The facts 
[charged] may be distinctly proved. But, if from particular cir-
cumstances, the jury are convinced in their own minds, that the 
[defendant] either had no intention to commit a crime, or that 
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the crime is not of so heinous a nature as to merit the punish-
ment concluded for in the indictment, in all cases of this kind, 
the jury have not only a right, but they are bound, by the spirit 
of their oaths, and by the laws of God and man, to find the [de-
fendant] Not Guilty of the crime .... They consider the nature 
of the crime, and the punishment that ought or ought not to be 
inflicted. In all such cases, the jury must necessarily determine 
both the law and the fact. 118 
Finding "law as well as fact," applying law to fact, or render-
ing a merciful verdict amounted to assessing the nature of both 
the defendant's intent and his act in the light of the punish-
ment that would follow upon his conviction. The jury might 
approve of the defendant's behavior, as in some political cases, 
or might disapprove of it but deem the prescribed punishment 
too severe, as in some common-run felonies. Very different 
underlying motives, to be sure, but nonetheless, at least within 
the confines of some jury tracts, the fusion of jury theories was 
complete. 
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Fox's Libel Act marked a triumph for those whose concept of 
the English constitution was grounded in history. It vindicated 
the historic role of the jury as the last line of defense against ex-
ecutive tyranny. Although precedent could be found for treat-
ing seditious libel as an anomaly, the prior official doctrine 
nonetheless seemed to many a dangerous departure from 
deeply held assumptions about English governance. 
At one level Parliament's concern was with the law. Fox's 
Act was couched as a declaration of the common law, resting 
less on specific precedent than on general principles of that 
law. 119 Parliament looked first to the law regarding criminal 
trials generally. That law was assumed to govern; exceptions 
would be tolerated only where that law itself provided compel-
ling reasons for them. Parliament's solution to the seditious li-
bel problem was also the result both of politics and of the 
nearly irresistible force of broad constitutional principles. The 
pressures from the expansion of rights of speech and press 
were enormous. 120 Those rights might still be limited (few 
questioned the appropriateness of punishment for truly sedi-
tious writings), but they could not be reined in through what 
appeared to society at large to be a drastic revision of the his-
torically vindicated balance of power between judge and jury. 
Retreat to the technical high ground of ''questions of law'' 
served only further to expose the government to attack by the 
opposition. In manipulating the balance of authority at trial, 
the government-or so it was seen-was manipulating the in-
stitution through which it had historically ruled and on which 
it rested its claim to legitimacy. Having administered the law 
largely with the aid of the jury (one is tempted to conclude), 
the Crown and courts found they could not now govern 
mainly through the bench. 121 
To appreciate the way in which the government was cap-
tured by its own administrative history, we must recognize 
how little England's rulers controlled the circumstances that 
made law fmding, or discretionary fact finding, a dominant 
element in the administration of the criminal law. For the most 
part, prosecution for felony, though privately initiated and 
joined by the government, proceeded in accordance with the 
attitudes of society at large. The alliance between authority 
and mercy-granting juries reflected a mixture of wise policy, 
shared assumptions about justice, and acquiescence in the in-
evitable.122 We must be cautious about extending the argu-
ment that authorities manipulated the selective enforcement of 
the criminal law in order to secure the deference of those they 
ruled to the problem of the use of the criminal trial jury. 123 If 
we focus too narrowly on the administration of the criminal 
law in the eighteenth century, we obscure the question of the 
roots of the system of mitigation. These practices were histori-
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cally the by-product of the criminal law in cases-theft and 
homicide-where frequently complainant, defendant, and 
jury were, relatively speaking, members of the same class. 124 
In such cases, the Crown and the bench and their attendant of-
ficials had an interest in overseeing the maintenance of order, 
but often they played the role of referees who lacked the re-
sources, time, or stake in the outcome to prevent the jury from 
reaching a verdict according to its own sense of justice. More-
over, these practices, which long predated the eighteenth cen-
tury, reflected social attitudes that were not easily managed or 
always willingly tolerated. This is not to say that authorities 
failed to capitalize on these sources of potential weakness, con-
sciously or otherwise. It is to say that, to the extent authorities 
reaped the benefits of governing through merciful justice, the 
interaction of rulers and ruled was complex and two-sided. In 
important ways, authorities prevailed at the behest of those 
they sought to rule. 
Our study of the seditious libel debate suggests that in yet 
another, related respect we must modify our understanding of 
the political and social implications of eighteenth-century law 
enforcement. The two strands of theory regarding the jury's 
rightful role could not forever remain separate. Jury law fmd-
ing in political cases could not be kept distinct from jury reso-
lution in common-run felonies. In the popular mind at least, 
the strength and reach of the arguments against the seditious 
libel doctrine were almost certainly influenced by the nature of 
jury practice in common-run cases. Might it be that the same 
authorities who allowed juries to share the powers of mitiga-
tion in common-run cases found themselves by virtue of that 
policy on the defensive in prosecutions for seditious libel? If so, 
we must recognize that authorities sometimes reaped, not def-
erence, but a bitter harvest largely of their own making. The 
irony is less striking than might at first appear: the policy of 
sharing powers of mitigation was, as we have seen, little more 
than acquiescence in practices authorities could not easily 
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have eliminated. Having (over the centuries) converted great 
weaknesses into moderate strength, England's rulers found 
that that strength had, after all, its naturallimits. 125 
It has been wisely observed that English authorities came to 
accept as binding certain concepts of due process in which they 
had cloaked their exercise of pure power. 126 Something akin to 
this phenomenon seems to have been at work in Parliament's 
resolution of the seditious libel crisis. The Libel Act debates re-
flected a consensus on one principle only, that the criminal trial 
jury should have a right to return a general verdict on all facts 
at issue. That principle was recognized as having long consti-
tutional standing. To deny it (or seem to deny it) in trials for se-
ditious libel was not only to offend that principle but to risk po-
litical fire for offending it precisely in those circumstances that 
suggested the worst sort of motives.l27 
Many in Parliament, certainly as of 1770, were, as a matter 
of legal theory, persuaded by Mansfield's defense of the official 
doctrine of seditious libel. 128 Precedent and the uniqueness of 
seditious libel seemed to ground an exception to the general 
rule. What, then, doomed the exception? Constitutionalism 
and politics are rarely separable. Parliament responded to 
both without being able to isolate either. The principle of a 
right to a general verdict in all cases had come to be identified 
socially with the prevailing theories regarding the purposes of 
the criminal trial jury. The principle was accepted by some be-
cause they believed its rejection would appear wrongly to be a 
rejection of more general principles that all in fact accepted. It 
was accepted by others who would themselves have viewed a 
rejection in that way. At base-in seditious libel-was the his-
toric role of the jury as a safeguard against tyranny. So long as 
that issue could be kept from being entangled with others, the 
sides might be clearly drawn. Much would depend upon 
whether one viewed the settlement of x68g as having rendered 
the safeguard unnecessary. But it could not be kept separate. 
So long as there were many who distrusted the role of authori-
ties in seditious libel cases, the settlement would never be sole-
ly a matter of institutional framework as such. It would of 
course be a matter of the movement for free speech and of the 
liberties of subjects generally. No doubt that is how many 
members of Parliament saw the issue. But it would also be a 
matter of how society regarded the practice of institutions, of 
the very real importance of de facto powers, such as those of the 
jury in common-run felony cases. The idea that discretionary 
lay fact finding was central to the administration of justice had 
taken on a life of its own, and no part of that administration 
could be shielded from it. Authorities could not, as it were, 
"bifurcate" the practice of trial by jury. The same judges who 
tolerated, or even encouraged, mitigated verdicts in homicide 
or theft could not easily explain why juries ought to play so 
limited a role in seditious libel. Notions of consistency and co-
herence were integral to the late eighteenth-century concep-
tion of justice. Nothing could gainsay them, not even the at-
tendant risk of more subtle forms of inconsistency and inco-
herence-that is, inconsistent jury verdicts-as the price of 
seditious libel law reform. 129 
The recognition of the right of the criminal trial jury to re-
turn a general verdict resolved one immediate political prob-
lem, but it contributed little to the resolution of some other 
long-standing problems of the criminal law. One of the impor-
tant side effects of the seditious libel controversy was its inten-
sification of the prevailing social conceptions of the criminal 
trial jury. The magnification of those conceptions and their 
translation to the sphere of political misdemeanors may have 
affected the administration of the law generally and delayed 
the movement for reform of the law of sanctions. l3o 
It is possible, of course, that the seditious libel problem and 
its resolution only temporarily delayed, and then ultimately 
accelerated, the movement for reform of the law of sanctions. 
The penal reformers' argument against jury law fmding-that 
is, against merciful fact finding in common-run cases-lost 
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some of its appeal when the integrity of the jury system seemed 
to be threatened in political misdemeanors. Resistance to the 
bench involved a glorification of jury independence; criticism 
of juries on all fronts may have become unfashionable. But in 
the years following passage of the Libel Act, juries, as is well 
known, convicted more often than they had before in cases of 
seditious libel. 131 The general verdict allowed the tenor of the 
times to affect decisions and reminded observers of the vol-
atility of jury attitudes. In those years, the warnings of Mans-
field, John Bowles, and others seemed to have been well 
taken: 132 the defendant's security was at risk; no one could be 
certain how juries would "apply" the law. One obvious solu-
tion to the problem of the jury that convicted against the law 
was a fuller right of appeal. But for the time being, the uncer-
tainty of the law produced by the general verdict in seditious 
libel cases may have made it easier for penal reformers to re-
turn to criticism of jury discretion in common-run cases. The 
solution there was not to do away with the general verdict-
that matter had been placed beyond reach-but rather to 
achieve certainty of law and punishment through the unmiti-
gated imposition of humane and moderate sanctions. 
Thus, if the seditious libel crisis did delay, it did not destroy, 
the movement for reform of the law of sanctions. The constitu-
tionalization of the general verdict raised the stakes for the 
penal reformers. Having reidentified the jury as the quintes-
sential democratic institution in English society, Parliament 
would have to demonstrate defmitively what eighteenth-cen-
tury reform proponents had only suggested: that the prevail-
ing practice of jury-based mitigation in routine felonies had 
grown to such proportions that it was making a mockery of the 
law. Nothing less would suffice before Parliament could re-
duce the jury's role as a mediator in common-run cases. 
Changes in jury trial would follow, rather than precede, 
changes in English attitudes toward the entire problem of the 
administration of the criminal law .133 
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